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BAR UNIFICATION - A CAVEAT
By EDWARD A. TOMLINSON*
On July 7, 1966, the Maryland State Bar Association at its 71st
Annual Meeting in Atlantic City gave approval in principle to the unifi-
cation of the bar in Maryland. The Association directed its Committee
on Bar Unification to draft a concrete proposal to this effect. So far
this Committee has given no serious consideration to the constitutional
questions raised by bar unification.' After a preliminary survey of the
unified bar, this paper attempts to analyze these questions.
Twenty-seven states have adopted various forms of a unified or
integrated bar through statute, 2 court rule,' or a combination of both.'
In all these states, however, the basic structure is similar: by statute
or court rule, the state bar association acquires an official status with
every lawyer admitted to practice in the state required to become a
member.' Lawyers must pay annual dues or membership fees directly
into the state bar treasury and non-payment results in the suspension of
a lawyer from membership and from the practice of law during the
period of his arrearage.' A Board of Governors or Commissioners
elected by the membership manages the affairs of the state bar and
controls the expenditure of state bar funds.' In addition this Board
normally determines the amount of annual dues within limits prescribed
by the legislature or court.8
Proponents of bar integration often argue that unification does not
require a lawyer to join anything but simply recognizes that he has
already joined the legal profession and has already become an officer of
the court. They expound further that unification merely establishes
an organizational structure through which the lawyers of the state can
collectively perform their obligations to the legal profession and to the
public. All lawyers, so the argument goes, should contribute equally
to the expense of this organization.9
This reasoning is simply not valid, because bar unification requires
much more of the individual lawyer. The state compels him to join and
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1. See the Report of the Committee on Bar Unification, 71 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION no. 2, p. 54 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
TRANSACTIONS].
2. For a well-drafted statute which has served as a model for other states see
California's State Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE §§ 6000-51 (1962), as amended,§ 6043, 6051-52 (Supp. 1965).
3. For a recent, well-drafted set of court rules see the Wisconsin State Bar
Rules, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 256 (App.) (Supp. 1966).
4. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-52 (1950).
5. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 6002.
6. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE §§ 6125, 6143; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 256(App.) (Supp. 1966) State Bar Rule 2, §§ 4-6.
7. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROP. CoDE § 6008.4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 256 (App.)(Supp. 1966) State Bar Rule 4, § 4.
8. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 6140.
9. For the first statement of this oft-repeated argument see The Report of the
Committee on State Bar Organization to the American Bar Association Conference
of Delegates, To Speed Bar Organization, 4 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 83 (1920).
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to support financially a state bar association which may well sponsor
programs and take official positions contrary to his interests and beliefs.
Upon his admission to practice law in Maryland, a lawyer becomes a
member of the bar of the Court of Appeals'" and, as an officer of that
court, accepts responsibility for his professional conduct." He is a
member of the bar of that court, but not of any private bar association,
such as the Maryland State Bar Association. 2 Following unification,
the State Bar Association will remain basically what it is today, a
private association, except that all lawyers who belong to the bar of the
Court of Appeals will be required, in addition, to become members of
this Association. The official status given to a unified bar 1 3 may sub-
ject it to increased legislative or judicial supervision, but this new status
does not operate to change the Association into a state agency or append-
age of the judiciary.' 4 Lawyers who favor bar unification may describe
a unified bar as a quasi-governmental agency,'" but they do not really
envision such a change because they want the members to maintain
their private control of the state bar association. 16 The primary goal of
those seeking a unified bar has always been the self-regulation and self-
improvement of the profession through a strengthened bar association.'
The operation and activities of a unified bar do not differ substantially
from those of a voluntary bar association.' 8 There is the same network
10. MD. CODE ANN. art. 10, § 1 (Supp. 1965) and §§ 3, 7-8 (1957).
11. MD. CODE ANN. art 10, § 10 (1957).
12. A private association is a group of individuals who have joined together in
a more or less formalized structure for the effectuation of a common purpose. Business
enterprises are not considered private associations. See Developments in the Law -
Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. Rnv. 983 (1963) ;
Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. Rtv. 993 (1930).
Bar associations have traditionally been considered private associations. Until the
1920's, most state bar associations had a policy of selective membership and only
invited the "better" members of the profession to join. Wickser, Bar Associations, 15
CORNELL L.Q. 390, 396, 403, 404 (1930). In addition, courts have held that bar asso-
ciations are private associations which can exclude attorneys from membership. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. Bar Ass'n of the District of Columbia, 197 F.2d
408 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; State ex rel. Contonio v. Louisiana Bar Ass'n, 111 La. 967, 36
So. 50 (1904).
13. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoD § 6001 (1962).
14. In Ex Porte Griffith, 278 Ala. 344, 178 So. 2d 169 (1965), the grievance
committee of the unified Alabama Bar Association filed charges of unprofessional
conduct with the Board of Commissioners of the State Bar against an attorney. The
President of the Board appointed a commissioner to hold a hearing and to take evidence
on the charges. The attorney argued that the proceedings were null and void because
neither the commissioner nor the members of the grievance committee had taken the
oath of office required by Alabama law of all state officers. The court held that they
did not need to take the oath because they were not state officers but members of a
private incorporated association.
15. TRANSACTIONS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 55.
16. Members of a unified state bar association normally elect their own Board of
Governors. CAL. Bus. & PROf. CODE §§ 6011-19; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256 (App.)(Supp. 1966) Wisconsin State Bar By-Laws art. III, § 1. The entire membership of
the unified bar has the authority to make final decisions on policy matters. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 256 (App.) (Supp. 1966) State Bar Rule 7.
17. See generally, Winters, Integration of the Bar - You Can't Lose, 39 J. AM.
JuD. Soc'Y 140 (1956) ; Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 50 (1945)(Reprint of Herbert Harley's kick-off speech for the unified bar, delivered at Lincoln,
Nebraska, in 1914) ; Report, supra note 9.
18. An exception to this generalization is the control which a unified bar exercises
in admitting and disciplining attorneys. These functions are performed in most un-
integrated states by court-appointed character committees. No doubt a unified bar
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of committees and sections and the same concern with the unauthorized
practice of law, professional ethics, public relations, judicial selection
and legislation.
Perhaps the closest analogy to a unified bar is a union shop. Labor
unions originated as private associations of employees. Today federal
labor legislation recognizes that a union with majority support within
an approved bargaining unit is the collective bargaining representative
for every employee in the unit and permits a union to make an agree-
ment with the employer, which requires every employee in the unit to
join and financially support the union. 19 Unions further resemble bar
associations in that they may sponsor programs or take official positions
opposed by individual members. Union expenditures for political can-
didates and lobbying for and against legislation are well-known features
of contemporary life. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,20
the Supreme Court interpreted the union shop provisions of the Rail-
way Labor Act and found a congressional purpose to deny unions, over
an employee's objection, the power to use funds exacted from the em-
ployee to support political causes opposed by him.2' The Court's serious
doubt about the Act's constitutionality, if it were read to permit such
use of exacted funds, led to the adoption of this strained construction.22
State bar associations, both voluntary and unified, do not normally
engage in political activities to the extent that is customary with many
unions. However, they often do engage in studying, promoting or
opposing specific legislation. At present, the Maryland State Bar Asso-
ciation devotes a substantial portion of its effort to studying legislative
proposals and often takes an official position on legislation of a con-
troversial nature.2' These activities on law reform are among the most
through numerous local committees can work very effectively to raise admission
standards and police its own membership, but the courts have uniformly held that the
admission and the disbarment or discipline of an attorney are judicial functions and
any action taken by the unified bar or one of its committees on these matters is "merely
recommendatory in character" and subject to full judicial re-examination. See, e.g.,
In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998 (1929).
19. The Railway Labor Act, 64 Stat. 1238 (1950), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964)
permits a labor organization subject to its provisions to make such agreements not-
withstanding contrary state law, while the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act) § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964) permits such
agreements only where not prohibited by state law. Under both acts the union cannot
require anything of its members other than the payment of periodic dues, initiation
fees and assessments uniformly required.
20. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
21. Id. at 768-69.
22. Id. at 749.
23. The Board of Governors approved an Association stand on forty-eight items
of legislation introduced in the 1966 session of the Maryland General Assembly and
directly sponsored seventeen bills. Report of the Committee on Laws, 71 TRANSACTIONS
no. 2, pp. 19-20 (1966). During the same session, the "legislative program" of the
Association consisted of eighteen separate bills, which had been officially approved for
passage by both the membership and the Board of Governors. Fourteen of these bills
were enacted and four failed of passage. Report of the Committee on Legislation, id.,
at 44-45. Included in this legislative program was the controversial Niles Plan provid-
ing for non-partisan judicial appointments. The Association "lobbied" unsuccessfully
for its passage. Report of the Committee on Judicial Selection, id. at 93. The enact-
ment by the 1966 General Assembly of a bill recognizing a broad psychiatrist-
psychologist-patient privilege was actively opposed by the Association. Report of
the Committee on Laws, id. at 20; Report of the Committee on Laws, 70 TRANSACTIONS
272-75 (1965). At the 1965 Annual Meeting, the Maryland State Bar Association
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important functions of the State Bar Association. The lawyers of this
state should use their bar organization to give the legislature and the
public the benefit of their collective judgment on pending legislation.
But this judgment is necessarily a majority one, and many individual
members of the Association may disagree with its official position on
specific legislation. Today, lawyers may express their dissent both with-
in the Association and without and may resign from the Association if
they are in strong disagreement with its position. The primary argu-
ment against a unified bar is that lawyers do not speak with one voice
on public issues and that a unified bar may exact funds from an un-
willing lawyer and use them to support or oppose legislation contrary
to his personal beliefs. Programs sponsored by a unified bar in other
areas, such as public relations, legal aid, the promotion of good citizen-
ship, and the prevention of unauthorized practice, may also be opposed
by individual lawyers who object to such uses of their exacted dues. 4
But it is the legislative program of a unified bar which has drawn the
heaviest fire of the opponents of bar unification, since the bar associa-
tion takes on overtones of a political or pressure group when it becomes
involved in the legislative process.
21
The first amendment of the United States Constitution may re-
quire an integrated bar to curtail its legislative program in order to
protect dissenting members' freedom of speech. When a challenge to
the constitutionality of the unified bar reached the Supreme Court in
1961 in Lathrop v. Donohue,26 the Court was sharply divided. That
case arose in Wisconsin, where in 1956 the highest court of the state
enacted a rule of court integrating the state's bar on a trial basis. In
1958, the court extended its integration rule indefinitely. A practicing
Wisconsin attorney, Trayton Lathrop, then sued the treasurer of the
State Bar for a refund of $15.00 in annual dues paid by him under
protest. Lathrop broadly asserted that the rules and by-laws approved
by the Wisconsin court coerced him to support the Wisconsin State
Bar Association in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
In his protest and throughout the litigation, Lathrop contended that a
major portion of State Bar activity was of a political and propaganda
nature and that the State Bar used its employees, property, and funds in
active opposition to legislation he favored.
The plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Clark and Stewart, framed the issues in
terms of whether the compelled support of group activities violated
Lathrop's freedom of association and freedom of speech. The Supreme
Court had previously held in Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson
2
that the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act did not abridge
approved a resolution endorsing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which would permit one house of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned on
other than a population basis if such a plan of apportionment were approved by a
majority of the voters of the state. Id. at 204.
24. The Maryland State Bar Association is presently active in all of these areas.
See the Committee Reports in 71 TRANSACTIONs no. 2 (1966).
25. See the argument of Trayton Lathrop in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,
822-23 (1961).
26. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
27. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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the employees' protected rights of association when it authorized agree-
ments between interstate railroads and unions which conditioned an em-
ployee's continued employment on the payment of union dues, initiation
fees and assessments. The employees who benefited from a collective
bargaining agreement, the Court reasoned in Hanson, should share
its cost by supporting the union financially. Brennan concluded in
Lathrop that a state could likewise require all lawyers to share the cost
of a unified bar association without abridging an individual lawyer's
freedom of association."8 Since the record contained no description of
the specific legislation opposed or favored by Lathrop and no indi-
cation of the extent to which the State Bar utilized his dues for
specific purposes to which he objected, Brennan did not resolve the
concomitant issue of whether bar integration in Wisconsin violated
Lathrop's freedom of speech by exacting from him annual dues used by
the State Bar to support political causes which he opposed and which
were contrary to his beliefs. The question of the state's power to unify
its bar did not come before the Court "so shaped by the record and by
the proceedings below as to bring those powers before this Court as
leanly and as sharply as judicial judgment upon an exercise of ... state
power requires."'2 9
Only four Justices, Brennan, Warren, Clark and Stewart, reserved
decision on Lathrop's free speech claim, but the Supreme Court never-
theless affirmed the Wisconsin court's dismissal of Lathrop's complaint
with the support of concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Whittaker and
by Mr. Justice Harlan (joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter). These
three justices found that the Wisconsin integrated bar was fully con-
stitutional and did not violate Lathrop's freedom of speech by using his
dues to support legislation or other controversial programs. Mr. Justice
Black, on the other hand, believed that the Wisconsin State Bar pro-
vided many useful and lawful services, but he dissented because he
believed that an integrated bar violated the first amendment when it
took the money of protesting lawyers to support political and legislative
causes which they opposed. Mr. Justice Douglas went much further in
his dissent and denied to the state any power to compel lawyers to
belong to a state-wide bar association.
Lathrop v. Donohue produced five separate opinions and left in
substantial doubt the constitutionality of a unified bar's engaging in
legislative activities. Seven justices did uphold Wisconsin's decision to
integrate its bar, but only three of these30 expressly decided that the
integrated bar in Wisconsin could use an objecting member's dues for
legislative purposes. Much of the jubilation in state bar journals 3' and
the Journal of the American Judicature Society12 following the decision
was unwarranted to the extent that these articles interpret Lathrop as
a complete victory for the unified bar. The basic constitutional issue of
28. 367 U.S. at 843 (1961).
29. Id. at 847 (1961) quoting from United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 126(1948) (concurring opinion).
30. Justices Whittaker, Harlan and Frankfurter. Only Mr. Justice Harlan
remains on the Court today.
31. See, e.g., Sinykin, Lathrop v. Donohue: The Integrated Bar Upheld, 34 Wis.
B. BULL. 74 (1961).
32. See, e.g., 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 43 (1961) ; 47 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 243 (1964).
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the restraints which the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech imposes on the activities of a unified bar remains undecided.
Law review comments on the Lathrop decision did not go along with
the victory pronouncements in the bar journals but acknowledged that
the Court had not decided this basic constitutional issue.33 Sometime
in the near future, a dissenting lawyer may bring to the Court a case
with a record which satisfies the scruples of the plurality and which
forces a decision on the free speech issue. What the result will be is not
known, but the Court is certainly moving today in the direction of
increased protection for individual liberties.
Legislative activities of a unified bar may well interfere with the
dissenter's freedom of speech by requiring a compelled affirmation of
majority-held views. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,4 the Supreme Court held that a state could not compel a
Jehovah's Witness enrolled in a public school to salute the flag. The
Court viewed the flag salute, with the pledge of allegiance, as a sym-
bolic but effective way of communicating ideas. When the state com-
pelled the Jehovah's Witness to salute the flag, it required him to affirm
a belief contrary to his own belief that the flag was a graven image.
The forced ritualistic sign and the mouthing of the pledge stamped the
unwilling child with a belief he detested, despite any mental reserva-
tions he might have and despite his full freedom outside of the class-
room to express his beliefs. The majority of the Court, without con-
sidering whether the religious faith of the child exempted him from the
duty to salute the flag, held that the state could not require such an
involuntary affirmation in the absence of a clear and present danger to
the public welfare.35
This reasoning does not automatically extend to the unified bar
since both the payment of annual dues and the formal enrollment on
the membership list are acts which do not so intimately connect the
beliefs of the individual lawyer with the declared views of the majority
of the bar. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized this lack of iden-
tification in the public mind between the official position of the State
Bar and the beliefs of the individual lawyer when the court formulated
the reasonable proposition:
[W]hen the State Bar of Wisconsin through its Board of Gover-
nors, an elected representative policy-making body, duly declares a
policy within its province on behalf of the State Bar, everyone un-
derstands or should understand the policy is that of the State Bar
as an entity separate and distinct from each individual. Such pro-
nouncement of the State Bar does not necessarily mean all of its
members agree with that pronouncement. .... 36
33. See, e.g., Comment, The Integrated Bar after Lathrop v. Donohue: Integra-
tion or Disintegration, 11 CATHOLIC U.L. Rev. 85 (1962) ; Comment, The Integrated
Bar Association, 30 FORDHAM L. Rzv. 477 (1962) ; Comment, Freedom from Political
Association: The Street and Lathrop Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 777 (1962);
Comment, The Compelled Contribution in the Integrated Bar and the All Union Shop.
1962 Vis. L. REv. 138; Integrated Bar Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 133 (1961).
34. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
35. Id. at 633-34, 642.
36. In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1958).
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Barnette still retains thrust in the area of the unified bar. The
same question of state power to compel an individual to identify him-
self with group beliefs must be answered with regard to the unified
bar - a private association engaged in private group activity. A
lawyer does suffer an impairment of his freedom of speech when the
state bar, which he is forced to join and support, sponsors legislation
or programs which he opposes. The private nature of a state bar is very
relevant, because a compelled money payment to support the program
of a state or any state agency or subdivision does not result in any
impermissible identification or attribution to the taxpayer of the policies
and views of the state. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, the state is
the one club to which we must all belong. For example, if a municipality
uses tax revenues to fluoridate its water supply, to lobby for increased
teachers' salaries or state aid for the local school system, or to pay the
police overtime to suppress peaceful demonstrations, the first amend-
ment offers no relief to the taxpayer who disapproves of these policy
decisions and who is identified with beliefs he detests on account of
his status as a resident and taxpayer in the local community. He does
have a cause of action if state law does not authorize the expenditures
of which he disapproves or if the expenditures are not for a public
purpose;" otherwise, lacking a judicial remedy, the dissenter must
work through the political process for the relief he seeks. While most
would agree with Mr. Justice Holmes, one may question whether a
private bar association is a club to which all lawyers must belong.
If the courts do adopt the position of Mr. Justice Black that a uni-
fied bar violates the first amendment when it exacts dues from a protest-
ing lawyer to support legislation which he is against, what relief is
available? Can the lawyer obtain an injunction against all expenditures
by the unified bar association for the disputed purposes, or can he resign
from the unified bar and then enjoin the enforcement against him of
the statutes or court rules which limit the practice of law in the state
to members of the unified bar association? In the union shop context,
the Supreme Court has held that the dissenting employee must settle
for lesser relief, such as restitution of that portion of his dues which
the union expends for political purposes." The Court pointed out in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street that the majority in the
union also had an interest in stating its views and that courts should
select remedies which reconcile majority and dissenting interests.3 9
Similar considerations may lead courts to grant equally limited relief
to dissenting lawyers. There is a good argument, however, that courts
should go further and permit them to escape the duties of membership
in a unified bar. Street was not a first amendment decision and the
37. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1947) ; Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
38. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774-75 (1961).
The dissenting union member need not allege and prove each distinct union political
expenditure to which he objects; he need only manifest his opposition to any political
expenditures by the union. However, the union must prove what proportion of the
funds are spent for political causes. Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 121-22
(1963).
39. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
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Court did not determine whether a union shop agreement abridged an
objecting employee's freedom of speech when the union used his dues
to support political causes. The only grievance of the dissenting em-
ployee for which the Supreme Court fashioned a remedy in that case
was his charge that the Railway Labor Act did not authorize the ex-
penditures."0 The dissenting lawyer, on the other hand, objects to
his forced identification with a state bar association which engages in
legislative activity of which he disapproves.4' If this forced identifica-
tion violates his freedom of speech, is not the appropriate remedy to
sever the identification by requiring the unified bar to cease its legisla-
tive activity or by permitting the dissenting lawyer to resign from
membership? The scope of the judicial remedy still remains a major
uncertainty in the wake of the Lathrop and Street decisions.
Lathrop v. Donohue should warn lawyers that a unified bar may
face First Amendment restrictions on its activities. Many lawyers of
this state may not take kindly to the activities of their new "union"
and may hamper its operation by seeking judicial relief. Whether a
lawyer can obtain judicial relief against unified bar activities other
than its legislative program is a further uncertainty following the
Lathrop decision. Trayton Lathrop found his forced identification
with the Wisconsin State Bar's legislative program objectionable, but
other lawyers may find objectionable the legal aid, public relations, or
unauthorized practice programs of the state bar. There has certainly
been sharp disagreement within the legal profession about bar associa-
tion sponsorship of neighborhood law offices funded primarily by the
Office of Economic Opportunity. A lawyer who disagrees with unified
bar's position in these areas seems equally as deserving of relief under
the first amendment as one who objects to its stand on legislation.
Apart from those imposed by the first amendment, there may
be other restrictions on the operation of a unified bar. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has held that the State Bar Rules and By-laws author-
ized the State Bar to support or oppose legislation related to the adminis-
tration of justice, court reform, and legal practice. That court has
warned that it
will exercise its inherent power to take remedial action should the
State Bar engage in activity not authorized by the rules and by-
laws and not in keeping with the stated objectives for which it
was created. If the lawyers of this state wish by group action to
engage in legislative activities not so authorized they will have
to do so within the framework of some voluntary association, and
not the State Bar.
42
The Maryland State Bar Association, as a voluntary organization,
faces no similar court restriction at this time, and has broad legislative
programs in many substantive areas of the law.
40. Id. at 771.
41. A dissenting employee covered by a union shop agreement may also raise this
point, but the majority opinion in Street did not find it necessary to pass upon it.
42. Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404, 409-10 (1960), af'd,
367 U.S. 820 (1961).
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Since Wisconsin integrated its bar in 1956, only Georgia has
added its name to the list of states with unified bars. The movement
for bar unification thus seems to be slowing down. Until the consti-
tutional issue is settled, bar unification seems an unwise course for
Maryland. It may carry its price in the form of restrictions on bar
activities and may not fulfill the hopes of its proponents of a more active
and influential role for the State Bar Association.
